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Research in social movements has emphasized the role of leadership and formal organizations 
in promoting and organizing collective action. In this study, I analyze an episode of mobilization 
that has been characterized by its participants as a leaderless spontaneous movement. Using 
data from audio archives, newspapers, and videos of interviews with former participants I 
conclude that although there were organizations and some forms of leadership behind the 
mobilizations, they did not have the preeminent role that theory predicts in organizing 
demonstrations. In fact, the work of the main organizers of the mobilizations reinforced the 
idea of a leaderless movement. In addition, I show that the notion of spontaneity grew out of 
the specific mechanism that allowed people’s direct participation in organizing the 
mobilizations, coupled with participants’ self-understanding of acting on their own with no 
external influence. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Ecuador returned to democracy in 1979, after several decades of military and civilian 
dictatorships. However, rebuilding democracy has not been an easy task for the country. Only 
three consecutive presidents have been able to finish the terms for which they were elected, 
and the possibility of coups d’état has constantly threatened the stability of the system. During 
the last twelve years the country has had 8 presidents, and no elected president since 1996 has 
been able to finish his term. Three presidents have been overthrown and replaced as a 
consequence of mass mobilizations and political contention, and the political instability is likely 
to continue in the years to come. 
 Apart from the political and economic costs of this complicated environment, there is 
one common feature in the last episodes of presidential dismissal that is worth emphasizing: 
the participation of social movements and organizations as key actors in the events. In fact, in 
all those cases organizations of indigenous peoples, students, workers, unions and other forms 
of organized civil society have successfully pressured the congress and the armed forces until 
they withdraw their support from the president. Abandoned by politicians and the military, 
presidents have been dismissed and replaced while people were still demonstrating on the 
streets. Nonetheless, the mobilizations that overthrew President Lucio Gutiérrez on April 20, 
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2005, known as the Rebelión de los Forajidos, differ considerably from the previous ones that 
removed presidents in 1997 and 2000.1  
Unlike previous cases this particular episode did not show a visible leadership, included 
“new” participants (children and seniors) and used repertoires with an enormous charge of 
symbolism behind them. Above all, some Ecuadorian scholars have emphasized the spontaneity 
of the movement, claiming that since people were able to mobilize without the help of formal 
organizations or traditional leaders, this mobilization has paved the way for a new form of 
democratic participation in Latin America where people affect directly the decision-making 
process. 
 Research on social movements has studied extensively issues concerning leadership, 
participation and repertoires of contention; however, this literature has concentrated almost 
exclusively on cases of long-standing struggles that have initiated equally long-lived social 
movements. But, what happens when mass mobilizations do not generate a well-defined social 
movement or a sustained struggle? Do week-long mobilizations follow the same logic as 
struggles over years? What “adjustments” do we need to do to the existing theory to consider 
these cases? Current research makes no clear-cut distinction between social movements 
pursuing a long-standing struggle and short-term mobilizations that arise and disappear within 
a few days. I maintain that an unambiguous distinction between short-term mobilizations and 
long-lived social movements is needed in the field, since temporary episodes, like the Rebelión 
de los Forajidos, offer distinctive features that still need an appropriate explanation. In this 
                                                          
1
 Table A1 in the Appendix schematizes the main differences and commonalities among the three cases of 
presidential dismissal of the last decade.  
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study I hope to contribute to the field by analyzing the mechanisms that made a short-term 
episode possible. To do that, I will concentrate on the particular leadership of the 
demonstrations and on the self-understanding of participants. I argue that the interaction 
between these two aspects facilitated the mobilization and reinforced the belief that the 
rebellion was spontaneous. 
 Recently, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2008) have pointed out that the study of processes 
and mechanisms has “the same ontological dignity as correlation” (p. 308). They claim that 
since mechanisms help to explain “what sort of event produces the correspondence between 
the presumed cause and the presumed effect” (p. 309), they enrich mechanistic explanations 
that look for correspondence between two variables. I rely on this idea to develop the approach 
I use in this paper.  
 In this study, I conclude that although there were organizations and some forms of 
leadership behind the rebellion, they did not have the preeminent role that theory predicts in 
organizing demonstrations. This happened, in part, due to the nature of the rebellion 
understood as a short-term mobilization that did not produce a long standing struggle. In 
addition, I will show that the notion of spontaneity grew out of the specific mechanism that 
allowed people’s direct participation in organizing mobilizations in Quito, coupled with 
participants’ self-understanding of acting on their own with no external influence. The result 
was a mobilization where people feel that they act only following their own will, although I will 
show that they were coordinated and led by a public figure.  
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The rest of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the most important 
historical facts for understanding the Rebelión de los Forajidos. Chapter 3 offers a brief 
discussion about leaders and leadership in social movements. Since one of the most debated 
characteristics of the rebellion has to do with leadership, I present in this section a short review 
that allows me to use properly the notions of leader and leadership. Chapter 4 describes the 
data and methodology used in this research, and Chapter 5 presents findings and discussions. 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2.0 THE REBELIÓN DE LOS FORAJIDOS (OUTLAW’S REBELLION) 
 
 
 
 
2.1 SOME PRELIMINARY FACTS 
 
 
Lucio Gutiérrez became president of Ecuador on January 15, 2003. During his campaign he was 
presented as an outsider to the Ecuadorian political system, champion patriot of noble ideals 
and hombre de pueblo (man of the people) excluded from political power2 (Merino 2005, Saad 
Herrería 2005a). He based his campaign on a leftist discourse which gained support from 
movements and parties from that part of the political spectrum.3 Nevertheless, when his 
chance of gaining the presidency increased considerably, he moderated his radical discourse 
and finally lost any clear ideological orientation.4  
From the beginning, Gutiérrez’s administration was involved in scandals of illegality, 
corruption and nepotism that, so it was widely claimed, quickly surpassed all levels previously 
                                                          
2
 The image of patriot soldier was based on Gutierrez’s participation in the events that caused the dismissal of 
President Jamil Mahuad in 2000. Due to his participation, Gutierrez was separated from the army. The image of 
man of the people, on the other hand, was based on his ethnic appearance that does not correspond to the white 
elite that has traditionally held political power in Ecuador.  
3
 The most important of these organizations were the Ecuadorian indigenous movement under the national 
leadership of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE); the Movimiento Popular 
Democrático (MPD) a political party closely related to one of the biggest public unions in Ecuador (the Unión 
Nacional de Educadores UNE); and the Communist Party of Ecuador. Table A2 in the Appendix presents a list of 
Spanish names of movements, parties and institutions mentioned in this study with their translation to English.  
4
 During his speech in Congress as new president, for example, Gutiérrez said that: “if sharing and being 
supportive, if fighting against corruption, social injustice and impunity means being a leftist … then I am a leftist! If 
producing wealth and promoting production means being a rightist … then I am a rightist!” (Quoted in Saad 
Herrería 2005b: 45)  
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observed in Ecuadorian politics. However, as Bustamante (2005) argues, Gutiérrez did not 
introduce new illegal practices into Ecuadorian public administration, since illegality, nepotism, 
and a general disrespect of the law are chronic problems of politics in Ecuador. What was new 
in Gutierrez’s administration was the way in which illegalities happened: openly, without even 
trying to conceal them from the scrutiny of public opinion. 
In order to advance his governmental plan, Gutiérrez established different coalitions 
with the same economic and political groups that he had blamed during campaign as 
responsible for the serious crisis of the country. Those coalitions did not last long and 
frequently ended as irreconcilable confrontations between Gutierrez and his former allies, with 
a consequent search for a new coalition in congress. For instance, the breaking-off of the initial 
partnership with the rightist Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), the most important political force in 
Congress at the time, forced Gutierrez to look for support from any political party willing to 
form a new governmental coalition in the legislature. 
The increasing opposition in Congress against the president and the threat of a legal way 
to remove him from office5 paved the way for the coalition that Gutiérrez formed with the 
populist Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE), a party “owned” by the former president Abdalá 
Bucaram, also removed from office in Quito in 1997.6 In exchange for its support the PRE would 
have asked to bring Bucaram safely back from Panama, where he was avoiding the Ecuadorian 
                                                          
5
 The strategy under consideration was a political suit (impeachment) against the president for illegal use of 
governmental resources. This strategy initially had the support of important parties in Congress (Social Cristiano, 
Izquierda Democrática, and Pachakutik). In the end, however, it could not get enough votes for consideration.     
6
 Abdala Bucaram was the first Ecuadorian president removed from office during the democratic period that began 
in 1979. His extravagant style of government not only led the most important political parties at the time to 
oppose him, but also important sectors of the population, particularly in Quito.   
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legal process. To do this implied the total reorganization of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court. 
Merely the announcement of the possibility of bringing Bucaram back to Ecuador shook Quito’s 
public opinion (Saad Herrería 2005a). 
Defending a policy aimed at eliminating the influence of traditional political parties on 
state institutions of control and regulation, Gutiérrez and the parliamentary majority that he 
formed removed from office important state officials, violating legal and even constitutional 
regulations, and new appointments were made with people loyal to the government. The 
officials removed from their offices were the members of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral 
(Supreme Electoral Court), in charge of the organization of elections, and the Tribunal 
Constitucional (Constitutional Court) in charge of constitutional supervision. Nevertheless, the 
most controversial action in terms of public opinion was the replacement of all the judges of 
the Supreme Court by judges close to the government and its partners in Congress. These new 
judges were to review and eliminate all trials against Abdala Bucaram, allowing him to return to 
Ecuador (Merino 2005; Saad Herrería 2005a, 2005b). 
To many Ecuadorians, these actions were only examples of a shameless and offensive 
style of government that jeopardized the image of Ecuador around the world (Saad Herrería 
2005a, 2005b). This style also included the appointment of people closely related to the 
president or his family as important state officials, but who lacked qualifications for such 
positions; the betrayal of the principles defended during the campaign and of the movements 
that supported them (mainly the indigenous movement of Ecuador); and the uncertainty 
caused by the huge number of poorly-considered official speeches and declarations that 
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constantly had to be corrected. Incompetence and even stupidity (Saad Herrería 2005a, 2005b) 
in public administration were evident,7 so that at the end of his second year in office, Gutierrez 
was opposed by important sectors of the population. However, it was the removal of state 
officials in charge of the highest courts of the country (November 2004) and particularly the 
judges of the Supreme Court (December 2004) that triggered a wave of social conflicts that 
later began the Rebelión de los Forajidos. (Figures 1 and 2) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Ecuador. Monthly number of social conflicts (Jan 2004 - Dec 2005)
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Source: Centro Andino de Acción Popular (CAAP) 
 
Figure 1 shows that there was also an important increase in the number of conflicts in 
September 2004. Those conflicts probably were more the result of the political campaigns for 
the elections of October 2004, which began to decline when the elections ended. As the reader 
                                                          
7
 A large list of governmental actions that exemplify this assertion can be found in Jaramillo (2005), Merino (2005), 
Ramos (2005), and Saad Herrería (2005a, 2005b) 
8
 Based on a review of two national newspapers (Quito’s El Comercio and Guayaquil’s El Universo) the Centro 
Andino de Acción Popular selects as social conflict any event that, being originated in political contention, can be 
classified under the categories: Threat, Blockade of streets, Removal of demonstrators, Arrest, Injured/Deaths, 
Invasions of private or public property, Trials, Marches, Strikes, Protests, and Seizures of public spaces.  
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can see in Figure 1 the dismissal of the officials of the highest courts in the country provoked a 
sustained wave of conflicts that starts in November 2004 and ends in April 2005 with the 
dismissal of the president. Nonetheless, the figure suggests that social unrest declined during 
February although it remained above the levels that had prevailed until September. This fact 
requires a short explanation. During February, political parties and traditional social movements 
tried to find an institutional solution to the political crisis of the country. They put pressure on 
the congress and some other institutions to find an answer mainly to the problem of the judges 
of the Supreme Court. The expectations generated by the results of these negotiations could 
have reduced the number of conflicts observed and reported by newspapers, such as street 
demonstrations, giving the impression that social unrest was also reducing. However, it is likely 
that political conflicts did not decrease but changed their locus moving from public places to 
institutional settings, something not reflected in the available data. Ultimately, those attempts 
failed and people returned to the streets in the last days of February since they perceived that 
they could do nothing to stop the situation, because virtually all state institutions were run by 
officials loyal to the government.  
One of the first groups that organized marches and demonstrations in December 2004 
was the law students of Quito’s private universities. Their demonstrations did not achieve a 
large number of participants, but they were successful in disrupting the typical political scenario 
of the city. Although street protests are quite common in Quito, their participants usually 
belong to public high schools and universities, generally gathered by the Federación de 
Estudiantes Secundarios del Ecuador (FESE), and by the Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios 
del Ecuador (FEUE), respectively. Both organizations have close links with the political party 
10 
 
Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD) and with the Unión Nacional de Educadores (UNE), so 
that they are considered as part of the institutional political system.  
From January 2005 on successive marches and demonstrations took place in Quito and 
Guayaquil. These activities were called by various organizations and social groups, and achieved 
diverse results in terms of participation. However, huge marches took place in Guayaquil 
(January 26) as well as in Quito (February 16) that had been called and led by the mayors of 
those cities, both members of the most important political parties at the time: Jaime Nebot in 
Guayaquil from the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) and Paco Moncayo in Quito from the Izquierda 
Democrática (ID). The government tried to confront the opposition on the streets and 
organized counter-marches. However, in Quito as well as in Guayaquil the marches of the 
opposition were larger than the counter-marches (Ramos 2005; Saad Herrería 2005a) 
Some observers of the marches in Quito during February (Ramos 2005; Saad Herrería 
2005a) have pointed out the inability of their leaders to keep up with people’s demands on the 
streets. For example, Saad Herrería (2005a) says that: “the ‘direction’ of the movement, its 
‘leadership’ *…+ is being surpassed by the demands and impetus of their own soldiers.” And he 
continues “people that occupied *San Francisco’s+ square shouted ‘¡Lucio Fuera!’ (Lucio Out!), 
but speeches from the stage [of Paco Moncayo] still talked about ruses, and legal tricks (p. 42, 
emphasis in the original). According to these observers, people attending the march felt 
disappointed at not being able to take more radical actions (Ramos 2005; Saad Herrería 2005a). 
Nevertheless, the disappointment caused by the leadership of the demonstration did not 
11 
 
prevent an increasing level of unrest (Figures 1 and 2).9 However, during March and the first 
days of April marches and demonstrations were called mainly by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), universities, unions, and isolated social organizations.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Ecuador. Type of conflict - Number of conflicts per type (Jul 2004 - Jun 2005) 
Source: Centro Andino de Acción Popular (CAAP) 
 
 None of these demonstrations achieved February’s participation, and only represented 
scattered efforts of protest usually centered on specific agendas (Ramos 2005). Despite the 
increasing number of demonstrations the government did not change any of its practices; 
instead it responded to protests with violence10 and an impressive campaign in the media, 
specially using radio and television to spread messages supporting its administration (Merino 
2005; Saad Herrería 2005a).  
                                                          
9
 Although the data in the figures refer to total number of national conflicts, the reader has to consider that most 
of them (approximately between 26% and 35% during the period January-June 2005) happened in Quito. 
10
 Actually violence and persecution of the leaders of the opposition was characteristic of Gutiérrez’s 
administration and precedes the protest wave. An account of the best known cases can be found in Merino (2005), 
Ramos (2005) and Saad Herrería (2005a) 
140
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 In this already troubled political environment an additional episode helped to increase 
people’s dissatisfaction with the government. On March 31, 2005, the president of the new 
Supreme Court quashed the processes against Abdalá Bucaram, allowing him to return to 
Ecuador. He returned 2 days later on April 2. Bucaram’s arrival coupled with a big show 
organized to receive him exacerbated hostility and indignation of important groups of the 
population against the government and the congress, particularly in Quito (Merino 2005; Saad 
Herrería 2005a). Confronted with a new situation, traditional political leaders reacted by 
launching a new wave of coordinated actions against president Gutiérrez. 
 Citizen assemblies were organized in the biggest cities (Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca), 
usually led by their mayors or by traditional political leaders. All those assemblies demanded 
the dismissal of all the judges of the Supreme Court from their offices and the quashing of all 
their actions while in office (Merino 2005, Ramos 2005, Saad Herrería 2005a, 2005b). However, 
disagreements among assemblies were evident about specific actions to put in practice, where 
and how. Even among the leaders of Quito’s Assembly these discrepancies were notorious.11 
Many participants in this assembly supported a radical position, and the idea of overthrowing 
Lucio Gutiérrez gained adherents.12  
 Quito’s Assembly was composed of various social organizations that included NGOs, 
citizens’ movements, political parties and leaders, students’ movements, and organizations of 
                                                          
11
 Whereas Paco Moncayo (Quito’s Mayor) sought the replacement of the judges of the Supreme Court, Ramiro 
González (Pichincha’s Prefect) said to journalists: “we want the removal of all those responsible for this situation 
*…+ the de facto judges, the conspirator deputies and even the president” (El Comercio April 5, 2005, p. A3. 
Emphasis added)  
12
 Guayaquil’s Assembly, led by the Social Christian Jaime Nebot, did not take an explicit side in this conflict, and in 
fact had no participation in the events that were about to happen in Quito. Therefore, in what follows I 
concentrate only on the events of Quito.   
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young people. All of them were gathered under the leadership of the Izquierda Democrática 
(ID). Although some well-known leaders of the indigenous movement also participated in the 
assembly, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), the most 
important indigenous organization, did not take part in the meetings. This organization 
considered that the conflict around the Supreme Court was basically a conflict among oligarchic 
groups struggling to take control of state institutions. This was in clear contrast with the 
situation in 2000 when the CONAIE, helped by some army colonels, was the main actor of the 
clash and was able to execute a coup d’état. 
 After several meetings, Quito’s Assembly was able to mobilize around 5000 people on 
April 5 (El Comercio April 6, 2005), including many workers of the city hall that were required to 
join the demonstration. The march tried to go to the Congress, but it was violently dispersed by 
the police. A new mobilization was called for the next day by the leaders of the assembly, and 
the strategy was to make demonstrations as many times as needed until the state returned to 
democratic rule. The assembly successfully organized important mobilizations during the 
following two days (April 5 and 6). However, the third day it had to suspend the mobilization 
due to lack of participants (El Comercio April 8, 2005, p. A3). This in turn contributed to 
reducing the credibility of the leadership of the assembly. 
 Although leaders of the assemblies of Quito and Pichincha had called for radicalizing the 
protest and organizing a general strike on April 12, in reality they had not announced any 
official decision. Instead they considerably softened their rhetoric against the president, and in 
fact the removal of Gutierrez from his office was not considered a valid option anymore. 
14 
 
Nevertheless, the leaders of the assemblies tied the general strike to the dismissal of the judges 
of the Supreme Court: if the judges were dismissed from their offices, the strike would not go 
on. Just in case, those leaders started to coordinate actions with their counterparts in other 
cities around the country to organize a general strike. 
 As late as Tuesday, April 12, the general strike scheduled for the next day was not 
completely defined, and the leadership of the ID had split into two sides. Whereas one side 
expected congress to dismiss only the judges of the Supreme Court and thus avoid the general 
strike, the other side also wanted the dismissal of the members of the Constitutional and 
Electoral courts to trigger a strike. In addition this second faction considered the overthrowing 
of Lucio Gutiérrez as a viable possibility. 
 Besides the leadership of the strike, potential participants and supporters were also 
divided. For instance, Quito’s Chamber of Commerce published a manifesto on April 12 
requiring all its members to participate in the announced demonstrations. However, on April 8, 
Pichincha’s Chamber of Industries also published a similar manifesto rejecting Gutiérrez’s 
administration, but asking people not to participate in the strike since stop working implied 
“serious *economic+ consequences for the country” (El Comercio, April 8, 2005, p. A8). 
 In the end, congress did not dismiss the judges of the Supreme Court so that, despite 
indecisions and divisions, the general strike took place on April 13. Nonetheless, the lack of 
clarity and coordination did have consequences in the number of participants that joined the 
mobilization: both the strike and the marches did not achieve the number of participants 
expected by their organizers, and the government interpreted this weakness as a triumph. 
15 
 
Traditional political leaders and Quito’s elite had failed in organizing an important opposition 
on the streets. 
 
 
 
2.2 THE ROLE OF PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES 
 
 
 Although Quito’s Assembly became the coordination center for massive mobilizations in 
Quito, smaller mobilizations were also organized independently of the decisions of the 
assembly. Marches and demonstrations happened on a daily basis in different parts of the city, 
called by diverse organizations. The most striking of all these efforts was the demonstration 
organized by the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador (PUCE) and its students.13  On 
Wednesday, April 6, all the buildings of the university were covered with black fabrics as a 
symbol of mourning for the “death of democracy.” That same day the students, wearing also 
black clothes, built a human chain that tried to reach the congress, but were suppressed by the 
police. 
 The involvement of the Catholic University was supported by authorities and faculty of 
the institution, and was not limited only to internal students’ organizations. In fact, the 
university released the same day a manifesto endorsed by university officials, professors, 
students and workers rejecting Gutierrez’s administration. This highlights two features of this 
wave of contention that started to appear evident to observers: the contribution of new actors 
and the originality in the repertoires used to protest. 
                                                          
13
 The Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador is an institution run by the Jesuit community on behalf of the Pope 
in Rome. In Ecuador it is considered a prestigious institution. Most of its students (but not all) are middle and 
upper class.  
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 The participation of the university took the political environment of the city by surprise 
mainly for two reasons: (a) the students of the Catholic University and the university as 
institution had never participated in street protests during the last few decades. The social 
origin of its students and the prestige enjoyed by the university led them to participate in 
politics in other ways than mass protests. Quito’s population knew this, and they were 
surprised to see students of the Catholic University demonstrating on the streets. (b) People in 
Quito were also surprised at the non-violent tone of the protest, a clear break with what was 
normally expected in street politics including the movements that had recently forced other 
presidents out. Ultimately the message sent to the city was that a non-violent protest was 
possible in Quito. 
 The Catholic University; however, was not the only university organizing 
demonstrations. During the followings days the Escuela Politécnica Nacional (EPN), another 
institution separated from street politics, and the Universidad Politécnica Salesiana (UPS) 
organized marches and mobilizations against Gutiérrez’s administration. These demonstrations 
were also predominantly peaceful and original.14 Although all the universities mentioned also 
participated in the mobilizations called by the Quito Assembly, they did not do it massively. 
Students from other universities also organized demonstrations, but they did not have the 
impact of the three universities just mentioned. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 For lack of a better word, in the context of this study I use the word “original” as synonymous for “different”. 
However, I want to emphasize the fact that many “ingredients” of the demonstrations were never seen before in 
the city, so in that sense too they were original.    
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2.3 THE MOMENT OF REBELLION 
 
 
Under the direction of Francisco “Paco” Velasco, La Luna radio had been broadcasting all the 
events that were happening in Quito on April 13. La Luna had also broadcast the meetings and 
debates of Quito’s Assembly, and had maintained an overt opposition against Lucio Gutiérrez 
and the entire political system. In fact, Paco Velasco had been one of the many journalists 
persecuted by the government. One distinguishing feature of the radio, particularly important 
on April 13, was its policy of “open microphones” that implied that listeners could make a 
phone call to the radio and state their opinions on air, so that all the listeners of the radio were 
able to listen to them, share them or reject them. 
 As I have mentioned, the general strike and the marches called by the leaders of Quito’s 
Assembly failed, and the president and his ministers appeared on television to celebrate their 
victory with speeches and accusations against the organizers of the mobilizations. Nevertheless, 
La Luna radio had been receiving phone calls from people rejecting the attitude of the 
president. Among all those phone calls a proposal emerged to organize a demonstration that 
same night, after working hours, at a specific place in the city, and without the participation of 
political leaders. The proposal immediately gained support from people that kept calling the 
radio to make suggestions for alternative places or strategies. El Comercio on April 24, 2005 
presented this account of the events:  
 
At approximately 3 p.m. a middle-age woman –whose name unfortunately disappeared- 
expressed at the microphone her dissatisfaction with the official version: “I came to 
work, but not because I support the government. I want to propose a protest after 
office hours.” *…+ More phone calls supported the idea immediately. Somebody 
suggested a place: “De los Shyris Avenue was important for Bucaram’s fall, why don’t 
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we go there?” Another one suggested the Villa Flora, a third one the neighborhoods … 
At what time? It has to be after dinner, around 9 p.m. … In that way, spontaneously, the 
strategy was born. (A22)  
 
In the end, it was decided to do a cacerolazo15 at the Tribuna de la Shyris, in the commercial 
and financial center of the city. That first day the cacerolazo gathered around 5000 people (El 
Comercio, April 24, 2005) who protested peacefully singing and shouting slogans. The Rebelión 
de los Forajidos had started. 
 Participants marched that night towards the Supreme Court, and although they were 
protesting peacefully, the police confronted them violently. A small group of protesters went 
then to Lucio Gutierrez’s house in a nearby neighborhood. Once there, they banged on their 
pots and shouted slogans against the government. The next day in a press conference President 
Gutiérrez condemned those actions, and called protesters vandals and forajidos (outlaws) 
accusing them of jeopardizing his family’s safety. Discontented people in Quito joined with La 
Luna radio to claim the description given by the president and transformed it into the label that 
identified “any person that feels something against the government.” From Thursday, April 14, 
people that called the radio identified themselves as forajidos. 
 La Luna radio established a dynamic relationship with the discontents. Since the first 
day of mobilizations, the radio became the focal point where people met to express their 
rejection to the president, look for information about the events in Quito, and participate in the 
protests. People’s opinions against the government were broadcast with no restriction despite 
the “bad language” used in some cases (and sometimes even shared by Paco Velasco and the 
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 Pot-banging  
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staff). People also called the radio to provide first-hand information concerning the political 
environment in the city. For example, when marches started, people called to alert protesters 
of the police strategies and movements to intercept them. When the demonstrations grew in 
size, this information was particularly useful and helped to coordinate appropriate reactions on 
the part of the forajidos.16 Another reason to call the radio was to denounce illegal or corrupt 
actions of the government, for example, use of public resources and employees to organize 
marches and demonstrations on behalf of the president, persecution of some public figures or 
excessive use of violence to disperse protests. Finally, people called the radio to propose 
strategies and coordinate actions or reactions. 
 All that information was processed, selected and broadcast in a very rapid fashion while 
trying to maintain accuracy. This centralized processing of information carried out by La Luna 
made it the most important and visible actor of the protests developed in Quito. The 
government as well as other media, especially radio, also recognized this fact. The former tried 
to close the radio down and the latter formed a sort of radio-chain to reproduce the signal of La 
Luna using their own frequencies. Although a few radios from other cities joined this radio-
chain, the activity was specifically concentrated in Quito.  
 However, the radio and its staff were not only a “transmission belt” of people’s 
discontent. Paco Velasco undoubtedly established a radical and defiant tone. His comments, 
analyses, interviews and his general communication with people did not conceal his radical 
opposition to the president and the entire political system. During his programs he called 
                                                          
16
 As I have mentioned before any person that rejected the government was considered a forajido; however, this 
definition is too imprecise for this study. In this paper I use the term forajido to refer to people protesting on the 
streets. When I use the term people I refer to the population of Quito in general.   
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people to join the mobilizations and also stirred people’s spirit, appealing to feelings of 
patriotism, dignity, justice, and rage. In many of his interventions Velasco even pointed out 
explicitly who were the enemies of people at that moment (police, state officials, politicians). 
As director of the radio, he also omitted some information from the reports he received, 
broadcasting only the information that was relevant to the protest. For instance, when 
somebody called the radio to defend president Gutiérrez or to condemn the rebellion, Velasco 
immediately cut the call and stopped broadcasting that opinion. Under Velasco, the radio 
became the most important mobilizer, helped in part by the support of other radio stations and 
the apathy of other media (particularly television).  
 However, La Luna was not the only means of coordination and mobilization. The role of 
personal networks, communicated through emails, phone calls and text messages was also very 
important for achieving important levels of participation during the days of protest. 
Organizations of civil society, unions and universities also contributed to recruiting people for 
mobilizations. Nevertheless, all these individual efforts were arranged under the coordination 
and guidance of La Luna. It has to be considered that, as a radio station, La Luna could establish 
with no restriction a wider and richer network. 
 Helped by these additional mechanisms, the radio was able to organize and coordinate 
night mobilizations during the week from April 13 to April 20. Those mobilizations removed 
president Gutiérrez from his office. Following the recommendations of its listeners, La Luna 
proposed “themes” for each day of protest, and every demonstration performed a specific 
action that gave the protest a particular name. Thus the cacerolazo of April 13 was followed by 
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the reventón, the tablazo, the rollazo, the frenazo, and the pitazo,17 all of them aimed at 
emphasizing the peaceful character of the protests. 
 All those actions had distinctive ways to criticize, satirize and challenge the government. 
The reventón, for example, happened when protesters burst balloons at a specific moment of 
the protest. The balloons in turn were intended to make fun of the president’s big cheeks.18 The 
tablazo and pitazo were aimed to produce noise, in the first case banging two pieces of wood 
and in the second using car horns. However, perhaps the most remarkable of all of those 
actions was the rollazo. It implied the use of toilet paper to cover houses, buildings, trees, cars 
and everything else in an attempt to clean the city of all the “shit” of Gutierrez’s administration. 
Other symbols and resources were used during those days including animals, masks, t-shirts, 
eggs, flowers, posters, puppets, coffins and books. What is interesting is that all these resources 
were widely used by participants. 
 Another aspect worth mentioning is that the mobilizations that started on April 13 were 
in some ways different from the mobilizations that removed Gutiérrez from office on April 20. 
Although some differences can be established between these two points in time, in this paper I 
mention only two important: the social origin of participants, and the violence observed during 
demonstrations. 
 The social origin of participants has been one of the most emphasized characteristics of 
the rebellion due to the participation of new actors in the political scenario of the city. Despite 
                                                          
17
 Table A3 in the Appendix shows a list of actions developed in the city during the week of protests considered in 
this study. Each action has a brief description and the date when it first took place.   
18
 References to the presidential cheeks abounded in public opinion since the beginning of Gutierrez’s 
administration. Editorials, jokes, cartoons and even songs referred to this characteristic of the president. 
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the differences among analyses and analysts, there exists a consensus around the fact that the 
Rebelión de los Forajidos was composed mainly of middle and upper class citizens in Quito 
(Bustamante T. 2005; Jaramillo 2005; Merino 2005; Pachano 2005; Ramírez Gallegos 2005; 
Ramos 2005; Saad Herrería 2005a, 2005b). Several indicators lead to that conclusion: (a) the 
space where the marches first originated was surrounded by middle and upper class 
neighborhoods, (b) the students that actively participated on the demonstrations studied 
mainly in private universities, (c) a number of participants arrived at the demonstrations in their 
own cars, (d) some demonstrations were organized as convoys, and (f) even the appearance of 
the protesters.19 Those participants attended to mobilizations with children and seniors, and 
also the contribution of women during demonstrations was extremely important.  
 To see middle and upper class people protesting on the streets was a completely new 
experience for the city. In Quito, street protests are closely linked to economic grievances, and 
therefore their participants are considered as belonging to lower classes. Moreover, due to 
excessive use of this strategy, most people in the city reject protests and demonstrations 
because they interrupt the normal activity of the city. Since middle and upper class citizens 
presumably do not have economic demands and they also reject street politics, they never 
participate in this kind of demonstrations. To see those people protesting on the streets was 
really surprising for everyone. For instance, a former participant of the demonstrations 
remembers that: “when the *students of the+ catholic university burned tires *to protest+, wow! 
[We thought] the problem is really serious here, I mean the situation is frightening and you 
                                                          
19
 Like most countries in Latin America, due to the Spanish conquest that established a white elite in the country, in 
Ecuador there exists the general belief that the more similar the appearance of people to the white ideal, the 
higher their social and economic status. See Hurtado (1997). 
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panic *…+ the students of the catholic university are burning tires, in Quito, what is going on 
here?” 
 Gutierrez’s administration also recognized this feature and tried to take advantage of it. 
The government labeled protesters as “oligarchy” and accused them of conspirators against a 
people’s government. With this rhetoric supported by an impressive campaign on the media, 
the president tried to delegitimize the protests. However, people’s support for street 
demonstrations never diminished. 
 Nevertheless, the middle and upper classes were not the only participants of the 
rebellion. By April 20 the demonstrations had a very diverse social composition; those who 
participated in the marches agreed that there were “all kinds of people” on the streets. La Luna 
radio had reached a wide social spectrum difficult to classify under a single category. Because of 
the radio, participation was not limited only to demonstrations on the streets, but also included 
phone calls to the radio to provide information. As a former participant remembers: “*during 
those days+ all of us were reporters for the radio” (Saad Herrería 2005a:17). Saad Herrería 
(2005a) identified two stages within the Rebelión de los Forajidos, one that starts on April 13 
and goes until April 16, where participants belong mainly to middle and upper classes, and a 
second stage (from April 17 to April 20) where the social composition of participants is hard to 
determine. Therefore, even if the rebellion started as a middle and upper class movement, in 
the end, the protests showed a very diverse social composition. 
 Observed violence during protests is the second important difference. The main reason 
for the discredit of street protests in Quito is the excessive violence used during 
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demonstrations, from both protestors and police, that usually implies destruction of public and 
private property and violent confrontations. Unlike those “traditional” forms of protests, 
people were called from the beginning of the wave of contention to participate in a peaceful 
demonstration. In fact, earlier mobilizations organized by various organizations already had 
emphasized the need to protest peacefully, so that the Rebelión de los Forajidos only continued 
that trend. Government, on the other hand, replied with unusual violence. 
 Some observers (Merino 2005; Ramos 2005; Saad Herrería 2005a, 2005b) as well as the 
most important newspapers in Quito have emphasized the excessive violence used by the 
police to disperse mobilizations. Given their lack of experience, many of the participants could 
not handle such violence, and the mobilizations were dispersed easily, especially during the first 
days of the protests. However, violence did not intimidate protesters, and the demonstrations 
gathered more participants every night. Many of those other participants brought with them 
the expertise needed to confront police violence successfully. Those experienced protestors 
were prepared to act with violence against the police, so that during the last days of protest, 
and especially on April 19, confrontations with the police were extremely violent since people 
were prepared to face “anything” to achieve their objective. 
 Through the radio Paco Velasco sent sometimes contradictory messages to the people 
on the streets. He stimulated people’s spirit to continue struggling fiercely, but he demanded 
that people avoid violent confrontations. At times the radio seemed to lose control of the 
mobilizations, and protests turned into violent conflicts with no pre-established plan or logic. 
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 Confrontations produced a lot of injured people and one fatality. Those events, in turn, 
aggravated people’s discontent, and exacerbated their rage against the government. At that 
point, institutional movements and political forces (mainly politicians in congress and the army) 
felt pressured to look for a final solution to the political crisis. Ultimately, congress dismissed 
Lucio Gutiérrez from his office and appointed the vice president as the new “constitutionally” 
elected president of the country. The army withdrew its support from the president and 
immediately put into practice a plan to help Gutiérrez flee Quito.  
 This victory did not put an end to the mobilizations, although it considerably reduced 
the number of people on the streets. This happened mainly for two reasons: in the first place, 
since the beginning of the wave of contention, the most repeated slogan on the streets had 
been “Que se vayan todos” or “Everybody Out!” meaning that protesters wanted not only 
Gutiérrez out of his office, but all politicians in congress and in state appointments. Everybody 
Out! expressed people’s will to clean the political system from corruption and reestablish a new 
government. After Gutiérrez’s dismissal some considered that the objective had been only 
partially achieved, and that they had to continue struggling to get corrupt politicians out of 
their offices. A small march went to the congress to demand the dismissal of all the deputies, 
but they failed in their attempt. 
 A second reason to continue with the demonstrations had to do with previous 
experiences of presidential dismissals. In 1997 and 2000, when Presidents Abdala Bucaram and 
Jamil Mahuad were respectively overthrown people did nothing to prevent those presidents 
fleeing the country and avoid Ecuadorian law. In 2005 people on the streets did not want this to 
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happen again. Coordinated by Paco Velasco from La Luna radio, protesters organized 
mobilizations to impede Gutiérrez’s escape from the city. The most striking action was the 
blockade of Quito’s airport to prevent any airplane leaving. Despite those actions, during the 
next days Gutiérrez fled to Brazil, helped by the army and the police. 
 The next section will review some relevant theoretical insights about social movements, 
paying special attention to the role of leaders within them.  
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3.0 SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
3.1 POLITICAL OPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND FRAMING PROCESSES 
 
 
The literature that explains the emergence and development of social movements has 
concentrated on the analysis of three main processes: the set of political opportunities (or 
restrictions) faced by the movement, the mobilizing structures available to the insurgents, and 
the framing processes20 where collective action is embedded (McAdam et al. 2006). In this 
account the rise and development of a social movement is produced by the interaction of these 
three processes and by the influence that one exerts over the other. The absence of one of 
these elements prevents collective action. 
 The interactions established among these aspects put in motion various processes at the 
same time. For instance, the set of political opportunities gives incentives to mobilization not 
only for the objective changes observed in the political system, but also for the new processes 
of reinterpretation brought about by those changes. Similarly, mobilizing 
structures/organizations are not only means to channel people’s grievances; affiliation to a 
specific organization determines how members analyze and interpret reality (McAdam et al. 
2006). In both cases, the reinterpretation of reality determines the identification of specific 
                                                          
20
 McAdam et al. (2006) define framing processes as: the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and 
social construction that mediate between opportunity and action. (p. 2) 
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political opportunities, and the use of particular mobilizing structures. The reader will see later 
that the relationship of an important number of participants of the Rebelión de los Forajidos 
with private universities had important implications not only for the origin and development of 
the mobilizations, but for how those people understood their own actions during the week of 
demonstrations.  
 Once a movement has been set in motion, McAdam and his colleagues maintain, its own 
actions will change the environment where the movement is embedded, giving rise to new 
opportunities (or restrictions), new processes of interpretation and new mobilizing structures. 
During this development the movement and its needs change, and new forms of organization 
should emerge. In general “While movements often develop within established institutions or 
informal associational networks, it is rare that they remain embedded in these nonmovement 
settings. For the movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring 
organizational structure to sustain collective action.” (McAdam et al. 2006: 13), in other words 
enduring collective action is impossible without an appropriate organizational structure. 
 This literature, however, is focused on episodes of collective action that have taken 
place for a considerable span of time, and pictures a social movement that grows in time 
gaining adherents, struggling for attention of third parties, and facing the reactions of organized 
opponents. In these cases, the need to act collectively produces complex social movements due 
to a conscious effort of activists and leaders to assert their presence in the political arena. To 
move beyond the stage of the initial mobilizations and affect the political system, activists and 
leaders of those movements have worked for a long time. In many of the episodes studied by 
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social movement scholars, mass demonstrations, mobilizations and collective action have been 
the product of years of hard work. 
 However, recent research on social movements has begun to study cases of collective 
action that have not moved beyond the initial mobilization-stage and therefore have not 
generated a permanent struggle or a “traditional” social movement21 (see for example Earl 
2007; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Opp and Gern 1993; Schussman and Earl 2004; Walgrave and 
Manssens 2000). In those cases, once the immediate goal of the mobilizations has been 
achieved the “movement” disappears almost completely. 
 If a mobilization does not turn into an enduring movement, it follows that insurgents do 
not need an enduring organizational structure to sustain collective action as the theory 
predicts. However, even a single mobilization needs a coordination mechanism and some form 
of leadership to transform a group of aggrieved people into collective action aimed to achieve a 
particular objective (Opp and Gern 1993; Walgrave and Manssens 2000). If these mechanisms 
exist, even if they are not institutionalized (for example, as a formal organization), they may 
help sustain the three processes mentioned before, and therefore they will produce collective 
action. 
 The case of the Rebelión de los Forajidos seems to match nicely the type of short-term 
collective action recently studied by social movements scholars. The rebellion was not the 
product of years of hard work by activists or movement leaders; instead, it developed in a few 
days, achieved its immediate goal and then disappeared almost completely. What were then 
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 I have not found a clear distinction to differentiate conceptually a social movement from a mobilization. In fact, 
many authors use the terms as synonymous.   
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the mechanisms that allowed aggrieved people to quickly coordinate their actions and produce 
daily mobilizations on a large scale around one specific objective? Before trying to identify 
those mechanisms I need first to clarify the issue of leadership during the rebellion. In order to 
do that I will review in the next pages some basic concepts generally accepted in the literature 
about leadership in social movements, and then I will consider whether the organizers and 
forms of organization observed during the rebellion can be safely referred to as leadership.  
 
 
 
3.2 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Most studies of leadership assume as given the existence of some kind of organization that 
coordinates and organizes collective action (see for example Kretschmer and Meyer 2007; 
Morris and Staggenborg 2002; Nepstad and Bob 2006; Reger 2007; Staggenborg 1988). These 
investigations explain leadership within this organizational context, exploring either the way 
leaders influence organizations (Nepstand and Bob 2006) or how organizations shape their 
leaders (Staggeborg 1988). In any case, when scholars refer to leaders of social movements 
they are actually referring to leaders of organizations within those movements (the well-known 
social movement organizations or SMOs). Although there are some studies that explore 
leadership within informal, non-hierarchical (“leaderless”) movements, the majority of the 
literature explains leadership in an organizational context. 
 Morris and Staggenborg (2002), for example, define leaders of a SMO as “strategic 
decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movements.” Thus, 
leaders act in two different (but complementary) fronts: the emotional level, inspiring people to 
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participate, and the organizational level, providing people the frameworks to act collectively. In 
doing so, leaders help to transform grievances and plans into actions. The authors argue that: 
“the early stages of a movement are typically an ‘orgy of participation and of talk’ in which 
participants share stories, socially construct meaning, and explore new ideas *…+ To mobilize 
movements out of these early interactions [and actually transform those interactions into a 
movement], leaders offer frames, tactics, and organizational vehicles that allow participants to 
actively construct a collective identity and participate in collective action at various levels.”  
 Some scholars (Gusfield 1966, Morris and Staggenborg 2002, Staggenborg 1998) have 
also implied that we can think of a leader as the “brains” behind the movement. Leaders are in 
charge of processing all the information available to the movement and offering effective 
strategies to achieve its goals; however, leaders do not remain simple advisors for activists. 
They usually have the authority within the movement to mobilize people and material 
resources according to their judgment. In fact, authority is probably the most common feature 
associated with leadership, although sources and kinds of authority vary tremendously in the 
literature (Freeman 1974, Nepstad and Bob 2006, Laclau 2007).  
Authority establishes a hierarchy within the movement (Gusfield 1966; Kretschmer and 
Meyer 2007; Morris and Staggenborg 2002; Nepstad and Bob 2006, Staggenborg 1988), and a 
problem for the organization. Because leaders usually become alien to the rank and file, or do 
not maintain direct contact with the base of the organization, they get “disconnected” from the 
movement, and in the extreme, leaders can even use their organizations to achieve personal 
goals (Kretschmer and Meyer 2007). Nevertheless, hierarchy seems to be an unavoidable 
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constant in social movements: even within the so-called “leaderless” movements there still 
exists some form of “elite” in charge of making decisions for the whole movement.22  
If leaders want to maintain their support and legitimacy, the disconnection between 
them and their followers cannot last long, and they have to develop mechanisms to include in 
their decisions as many insights as possible from the rank and file, or at least pretend they are 
including them (Stokes 2001). Many organizations have established different levels of 
leadership and have developed mechanisms to improve member’s participation on the 
decision-making process. The evidence suggests that the effective exchange of information 
within the movement is key to the success of leadership (Morris and Staggenborg 2002). 
 The task of transforming scattered aggrieved people into an organic movement with 
well-defined objectives requires a work of coordination and organization at different levels, and 
social movements have developed different types of leadership or different teams of leaders to 
cope these multiple tasks (Earl 2007, Nepstad and Bob 2006, Freeman 1974, Gusfield 1966, 
Reger 2007, Morris and Staggenborg 2002). In general terms the number of tasks to be fulfilled 
by leaders depends on the size of the movement and on its development (Gusfield 1966; 
Staggenborg 1988): bigger and more complex movements have to constitute different levels of 
leadership in charge of specific tasks. 
 The literature has also highlighted the importance of leaders as the image of the 
movement. For their followers, leaders are “the soul and conscience of the movement” 
(Gusfield 1966:142) and their job is to communicate appropriately the message of the 
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 Feminist movements in the U.S. during the 60’s tried to avoid this hierarchical organization, but their efforts 
most of the times did not work or caused additional problems to their organizations (Freeman 1973)    
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movement to the society they are trying to influence. If they are successful, their organizations 
will gain support from other participants and third parties, but they will also be targeted by 
authorities and organizations from the opposition. In their role as “images”, the relationship 
established between leaders and media is very important in determining how the message of 
the movement is released (Morris and Staggenborg 2002). 
 Unlike those traditional studies, recently some scholars have studied forms of 
leadership that emerge from particular mobilizations where formal organizations do not have a 
crucial influence (Earl 2007; Reger 2007; Schussman and Earl 2004).  In these non-
organizational settings23 scholars identify people performing tasks related to leadership, but 
who do not fit the models of leadership in the earlier literature. In general, these works analyze 
specific tasks developed by “leaders” (Earl 2007) or the type of mobilization caused by the 
“leadership” (Reger 2007). This new research agenda questions the ideas established in the 
earlier literature, including the very concept of leadership, and propose new approaches for its 
study in cases where the roles of leaders and followers are not completely clear.  
For the purpose of this study the work of Earl (2007) is of special interest within this 
new stream of research. This scholar proposes an approach “empirically closer to the 
phenomena” that guarantees “greater clarity and precision” (Earl 2007:1345) based on the 
specific tasks that “leaders” fulfill within the movement. After a thorough review of the existing 
literature, Earl (2007) sketches the main leadership tasks identified in previous studies and 
classifies them into a few categories to facilitate the analysis. I do not reproduce here her 
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 Earl (2007) studies the case of strategic vote in presidential elections, a form of collective action developed over 
an internet platform, whereas Reger (2007) studies the case of emotional mobilization in today’s feminism in the 
U.S.   
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complete classification, but list the broad categories. According to Earl (2007) leaders perform 
tasks aimed at accomplishing one or more of the following objectives: (a) articulating vision and 
ideology of the movement, (b) engaging the political environment, (c) framing the movement 
and its issues, (d) managing relations with non movement actors, (e) making strategic and 
tactical decisions, (f) organizing specific actions, (g) managing the internal life of the movement, 
(h) innovating and entrepreneurial activity, and (i) providing social capital (Earl 2007:1330-
31).In this view people performing any of these tasks can be considered as  leaders of the 
movement even if they do not match the ideal of a leader existing in the traditional literature. 
 
 
 
3.3 LEADERSHIP DURING THE REBELIÓN DE LOS FORAJIDOS 
 
 
In this section I have highlighted three specific issues concerning leadership in social 
movements: the concept of leader, the problem of authority and disconnection, and the 
specific tasks filled by leaders within a movement. With these theoretical insights in mind, in 
what follows I will verify if there were some people or organizational structures that can be 
treated as leadership during the Rebelión de los Forajidos. Although the problem of leadership 
in the rebellion is worth a new, independent research project, my purpose in this section is 
simply to highlight the existence of some kind of organizers that in fact can be considered as 
the leaders of the mobilizations. By doing so, I can concentrate my attention on the 
mechanisms established between “leaders” and “followers” that made the Rebelión de los 
Forajidos possible.    
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As I have already mentioned, after the mobilizations called by Quito’s mayor on April 13 
failed, people started calling the radio station demanding a response against the government’s 
cynicism, and through the broadcasting of La Luna an “orgy of participation and of talk” took 
place in the city. In this process Paco Velasco played an extremely important role since he 
stimulated people’s communication and active participation. He framed people’s discontent, 
and certainly encouraged people to take the issue into their own hands and go to the streets to 
protest. However, this work occurred in a slightly different way from theoretical accounts about 
leaders.  
In the ideal-typical process of organizing a demonstration, a team of social movement 
leaders plans strategically where, when and how to organize a demonstration that effectively 
disrupts the targeted political scenario. It is the leadership team of a social movement, acting 
on behalf of the discontented people and recognizing the set of political opportunities and 
risks, that leads the movement to the streets. The case of the Rebelión de los Forajidos was 
different in this respect, because there was no chance to plan strategically the mobilizations (at 
least at the beginning) and in fact there was not any team of leaders responsible for the 
organization of mobilizations. It was the people calling to the radio that put pressure on the 
broadcasters to do “something,” and offered the organizers an ample range of alternatives for 
collective action. Broadcasters at La Luna, and specifically Paco Velasco, did not construct 
frames, tactics or organizational vehicles from scratch. Instead they helped to coordinate 
collective action by selecting strategies and actions from people’s proposals. 
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This particular method used to organize the demonstrations avoided the problem of 
disconnection between organizers and the rank and file. On the contrary, by acting in this way 
broadcasters reinforced the feeling of democratic participation among discontented people in 
Quito, and gained legitimacy as the “leaders” of the mobilizations. People followed the radio 
station because the radio was advancing people’s wishes and objectives. In this way, it was the 
people who put pressure on broadcasters to become the leaders of the mobilizations, and 
granted them recognition as leaders and authority to act on their behalf.  
It is safe to conclude (based on the evidence available for this research) that Paco 
Velasco and his staff acknowledged the privileges they had been given by people, but instead of 
assuming “officially” the leadership of the rebellion, they avoided any label of leader, and 
stressed the idea that they were only part of the common people. For example, in an interview 
he gave to a newspaper, when asked if he was the leader of the rebellion, Paco Velasco 
answered that: “Me? A leader? Are you nuts? In the Revolución de las Alcabalas, is there a 
memory of a leader? Is there such memory in the Revolución de los Estancos24? No. The leader 
is people’s dignity. It is the people who take the streets and overwhelm us all”. By rejecting 
being considered the leader of the rebellion, Velasco eliminated the risk of a hierarchical 
movement, and maintained intact the legitimacy of his authority at the same time. During the 
final moments of the rebellion, even prominent figures such as political leaders, journalists, and 
authorities recognized the authority of Velasco and coordinate with him actions and strategies. 
                                                          
24
 The Revolución de las Alcabalas and the Revolución de los Estancos are episodes of the Ecuadorian history where 
the people protested against colonial authorities in Quito. Both episodes are important because they constitute 
the first attempts of Ecuadorians to obtain independence from the Spanish crown, although both were 
unstructured movements.   
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A “leader” that does not want to be considered as such within a movement that claims 
not to follow any particular leader raises the question about the possibility of a movement 
without leaders, and in fact the lack of formal organizations behind the mobilizations 
contributes to reinforce the image of a leaderless movement. Nevertheless, despite the 
resistance on the part of Velasco to accept the label of leader, it is an incontrovertible fact that 
he was actually performing some leadership tasks (Earl 2007) during the days of the rebellion. 
Given the importance and salience of these tasks I can safely conclude that Paco Velasco was in 
fact the leader of the Rebelión de los Forajidos.   
Velasco was the most recognizable image of the movement. Pictures of him appeared 
constantly in newspapers, and he personally appeared many times in interviews and 
nationwide TV programs. For the mass media, Paco Velasco was the official spokesman of the 
rebellion. He also articulated the movement around one specific objective (Lucio Out!), 
although he did not elaborate the objective but took it from people’s proposals. He offered the 
frame for mobilization, processed all the information relevant to the movement and made 
strategic decisions in close relationship with discontented people. He and his staff at the radio 
helped to coordinate specific actions and mobilize people offering instructions and advice from 
the radio station. The role played by Velasco and the broadcasters of La Luna was so important 
for the mobilizations that, after years of the events, Paco Velasco and the radio station are still 
connected to the Rebelión de los Forajidos in people’s minds. For instance, Paco Velasco is 
frequently invited to talk in TV programs and interviews as a representative of the espíritu 
forajido (outlaw spirit) of those days. 
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I conclude that the Rebelión de los Forajidos was not a leaderless movement. There 
were people and institutions (mainly the radio station) performing leadership tasks that helped 
to coordinate actions and encouraged participation. “Leaders” of the movement rejected that 
label and organized the mobilizations through a method that strengthened a feeling of 
democratic non-hierarchical participation, giving the impression that the movement did not 
need organizers or leaders. The Rebelión de los Forajidos had leaders, but that leadership does 
not match the ideas commonly accepted in the literature.  
Now that I have clarified some aspects about the leadership of the rebellion I can return 
to the task of answering the question: what were the mechanisms that allowed aggrieved 
people to quickly coordinate their actions and produce huge mobilizations around one specific 
objective?   
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4.0 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
My main body of information comes from 9 semi-structured interviews and 2 informal 
conversations with former participants in the demonstrations that took place in Quito during 
the week from April 13 to April 20, 2005. I have also used data from the two most important 
newspapers in Quito: El Comercio and Hoy, from La Luna radio, from the large body of 
academic and non-academic literature written about the issue in Ecuador, and from video 
reports made by independent producers. As a participant in the events, I also used my own 
memories of the episode as a source of information. 
The interviews I am using here were made in May 2005 as part of the production of the 
short documentary “Jóvenes Creando su Historia” (Young people building their own history). 
This documentary was about the role of college students during the Rebelión de los Forajidos. 
The project as well as the interviews was conducted by two undergraduate students of 
Anthropology and one undergraduate student of Archeology of the Universidad Politécnica 
Salesiana in Quito, Ecuador. Each interview was video recorded, had one or two interviewees,25 
was about one hour long, and took place in the campuses of the universities where the 
interviewees studied at the time. I obtained non-written consent from the producers of the 
project to use their material.  
                                                          
25
 There was only one interview with three interviewees. 
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I watched the videos to select the interviews relevant to my interests. Out of 13 I chose 
to use 9 interviews, considering the quality of the video and sound, and the reliability of the 
information. In some cases the interviewees did not take seriously the interview and gave just 
short or unrelated answers to the questions. This lack of interest is evident in the gestures, 
attitudes and body movements of the interviewees. I eliminated all these cases from my 
sample. In summary, the information considered for this study was provided by 16 students: 7 
females and 9 males in an age range between 19 and 23 years, with only one male 36-year-old 
student. Out of the total, 12 were students of private universities at the time, and the 
remaining 4 studied in public universities. Almost all the interviewees (15) were studying for 
careers related to social sciences26 and only one for a technical career. 
I did transcriptions of the interviews using numbers to identify them and codes to have 
references of the interviewees. Then I did inductive coding of these transcriptions looking for 
emergent themes or ideas. Two main topics emerged from this process: the role of La Luna 
radio, and the self understanding that participants had of their actions. Using these topics as a 
focal point I returned to the transcriptions looking for more detail and complementary data. In 
the process I also used information from newspapers and of the journalistic and scholarly 
literature to contextualize and clarify some of the statements of the interviewees. This work 
allowed me to elaborate analytical memos that ultimately constitute the basis for the 
discussion and interpretations that I present here. 
                                                          
26
 Social Communication (4), Sociology and Political Science (1), Anthropology (5), Archeology (1), Psychology (2), 
History (1), and Law (1) 
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As a strategy to support the information I obtained from the interviews, and refresh my 
memories about my participation in the demonstrations of April 2005 I had two informal 
conversations in March 2008 with friends who also are former participants. Both are women 
who studied Economics in private universities and one of them (the older) was not a student at 
the time of the Rebelión de los Forajidos. They were 26 and 34 years old at the moment of the 
conversation. These conversations were semi-structured, although the main point of them was 
to exchange memories of the political events that happened in 2004 and 2005: instead of 
collecting data only from one participant (the interviewee) my purpose with the conversation 
was to establish an interaction between the researcher and the participant. I recorded the 
conversations and took notes, but I did not code them. These conversations helped me to 
reconstruct and remember some of the facts that I had witnessed myself in 2004 and 2005. 
I have also used daily editions of Quito newspapers: El Comercio and Hoy. Although I 
cannot provide data on the readership, it is widely recognized that both newspapers are the 
most important and reliable sources of information in Quito. I checked the complete daily 
editions of both newspapers for April 2005, but collected only the pages devoted to political 
events or news related to the political situation in Quito. For El Comercio usually the first six 
pages of the main section (Section A) are devoted to political and economic issues in Ecuador 
(including the editorial pages) and for Hoy mainly the first four pages of the main section. I have 
used the second edition of both newspapers: given that the demonstrations I am considering in 
this work took place mainly at night (starting around 9 p.m.) and that the first edition of the 
newspapers goes to press around 10 or 11 p.m. (which means that all the articles have to be 
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ready around 7 or 8 p.m.) sometimes the first edition of the newspapers did not include 
coverage of the events of the previous evening.27 
As I mentioned before, I used the information from the newspapers to contextualize the 
data I obtained from other sources. Therefore I did not do any coding of this information. 
Newspaper coverage, for instance, allowed me to see how the government reacted to the 
demonstrations, or how the insurgents reacted to specific governmental or congressional 
movements. Newspaper data also illustrate the way media framed the protest, and in this 
particular case the way the press helped legitimize and reinforce protests and demonstrations. 
One important contribution was the photographs that appeared illustrating the news. These 
photographs helped me to get an idea of the participants and the means they used during each 
day of protest. Newspapers also provided me with short interviews with participants and some 
key actors of the mobilization. 
I have also used information from audio archives of La Luna radio. This radio station 
registered its broadcastings during 2005 in a .mp3 format, but keep only selected files in an 
audio library.28 The archives contain a wide range of activities including speeches, phone calls, 
songs, jingles, interviews, testimonials, and news reports. They have been recorded completely 
at random, are in no specific order, and are undated. The only clue to establish their sequence 
was the date when the archive was first originated. But, in a few cases this date does not 
                                                          
27
 Both newspapers release two editions daily. The first is available early in the morning (around 6 a.m.) and the 
second one appears some hours later. During the week of protests it is remarkable how different were the first 
and second editions of El Comercio, mainly in the cover page where even the whole layout changed. 
28
 When gathering these data, people at La Luna told me that they had a serious problem in the main computer of 
the radio and had to reset the hard drive a couple of years ago. According to them, due to this problem a lot of 
audio archives were missed and the remaining ones may have suffered some changes. They keep in the audio 
library the files they could recover and which are considered important.  
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correspond to the chronology of the events.29 Almost all archives are named using ‘hints’ to 
recognize the event to which they refer. Only 8 audio files have no name and are listed as 
“Untitled.” 
Based on the date of last modification of the archive (“Date Modified”) I classified the 
archives by year and month and saved them in new folders. For this study I drew on the files for 
March and April 2005. To “clean” the information, I listened to the audio files in order to verify 
the accuracy of their name and date, the existence of repeated or empty files and the quality of 
the sound. I eliminated files that did not correspond to the dates I was interested in, and also 
eliminated repeated, empty or damaged files. After this cleaning process I got 129 valid audio 
files or approximately 13 hours of broadcasts: 34 files or 3.5 hours for March, and 95 files or 9.5 
hours for April.  
I did not do transcripts of the information on the files, instead I employed tables to 
process the data. I made two tables, one for each month, to show the archives classified by 
date, duration, type, main actor in the file, relevance of the information for this study, and 
content of the file. These attributes of the information helped me to handle the data easily and 
find references quickly when needed. Since I used this information as backup to the interviews, 
this strategy was adequate.30 In the type column I employed categories such as song, interview, 
commercial, declaration, denunciation, speech, news report, news program, phone call, 
comment, testimonial, or a combination of them. Under actor I put the names of the people 
whose voices can be recognized in the file. I also assigned codes to each file to signal its 
                                                          
29
 I used several sources of information in order to establish the chronology of the events, mainly newspapers and 
books about the topic. 
30
 Of course a more analytical use of the information would require a different treatment. 
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relevance for this study on a scale from “not relevant” to “extremely relevant.” Finally, I 
included detailed notes about the content of each audio file pointing out some important 
features of the information such as the development of the events, specific words or phrases 
used by the actors, and tone of the speeches or declarations. The information provided by the 
audio files was also considered to produce the analytical memos I have already mentioned. 
My last source of information was the large body of literature written by analysts, 
participants, and historians after the mobilizations. I chose books and articles that dealt with 
the role of the participants during the demonstrations, or offered a general context for the 
interpretation of the events. Some books and articles were not included as a source of 
information given their excessive bias to one of the sides of the dispute. However, most 
accounts used in this study are very sympathetic with the insurgents and La Luna radio. In 
general, I used the information provided by this literature for a broad picture of the historical 
environment where the mobilization took place. 
The information I have used for this research sets some limitations to the findings I 
present in the next section. The most important limitation has to do with the kind of 
participants I am considering here: mainly college students of middle class universities located 
in downtown Quito. One of the main features of the Rebelión de los Forajidos was the 
surprising involvement of new participants during marches and demonstrations (including 
children, seniors, and women); however, my interview sample was composed entirely of 
college students. Since I used this information extensively throughout this research, my 
findings, interpretations and conclusions refer basically to college students. 
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I have two reasons to justify my use of this information: first, although I cannot offer 
quantitative data about the importance of student participation during the mobilizations of 
April 2005 in Quito, all accounts of the events agree that the most numerous and active group 
of participants was the college students (see for example Jaramillo 2005; Merino 2005; Ramos 
2005; Saad Herrería 2005a, 2005b) Therefore, their participation was important and influential 
for the whole movement. Second, the information provided by the interviews was also 
extremely attractive given the short period of time between the events considered and the 
interviews. This information allowed me to analyze some details and nuances that could have 
disappeared from today’s memories. 
A different concern has to do with a sort of bias in the information provided by the 
students. Given their status as college students in the social sciences, most interviewees 
sometimes tend to mix their answers with their own analysis of the situation, so that their 
answers became a combination of the stories of their own experiences and their 
interpretations of what “the others” did. I tried to avoid this bias by paying more attention to 
the experiences of the interviewees (for example, when they speak in first person) and relating 
this information to that available from other sources, particularly the audio files of La Luna 
radio. However, the way students understand others’ actions is also a source of interesting 
data. 
With these concerns taken into consideration I approached my information looking for 
an explanation for how a mobilization that overthrew a democratically elected president could 
have been prepared without the visible participation of any organization or leadership. The 
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preliminary assessment of my data showed me that in fact there were some organizations 
participating and there was a visible, although special, leadership for the mobilizations. 
Nevertheless, most accounts of the Rebelión de los Forajidos, including news reports and even 
interviews, have strongly emphasized the “spontaneity” of the mobilizations, understood as the 
absence of formal organizations or leadership behind the rebellion. Why do people still think 
that the rebellion was spontaneous despite the participation of some organizations and the 
existence of a visible leadership? In the next section I point out some ideas that help to 
understand this particular phenomenon. 
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5.0 INTERPRETING THE REBELLION 
 
 
 
 
5.1 TIME TO TAKE THE BULL BY THE HORNS 
 
 
In recent work S. Mainwaring, A. M. Bejarano y E. Pizarro Leongómez (2006) called the current 
political environment in some countries of the Andean Region a crisis of democratic 
representation. These scholars argue that this crisis has become evident in indicators such as 
lack of confidence in democratic institutions of representation, high electoral volatility, collapse 
of the party system, political figures that appear as outsiders to the political system, and 
reduced interest in elections and voting (Mainwaring et al. 2006). All these features describe a 
situation in which “citizens do not believe they are well represented *by democratic institutions 
or politicians+.” (Mainwaring et al. 2006:15) Therefore, the political environment can be 
appropriately described as a general distrust and rejection of all “professional” politicians and 
institutionalized politics. 
 In Quito this rejection was particularly evident against President Gutiérrez and the 
political parties that supported him. For instance, in October 2004 (before the dismissal of the 
judges of the Supreme Court) Ecuador had general elections to choose local and provincial 
officials. In those elections candidates supported by the government or connected to it 
achieved very poor results (Figures 3 and 4) which is an indicator of the reduced popular 
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support for Gutiérrez administration. After the dismissal of important state officials (November 
2004), this support should have been reduced even more.  
 
 
Figure 3. Quito. Electoral results of October 2004 elections (percentage) 
Source: Tribunal Supremo Electoral
31
 
 
 
 As the reader can see, the candidates Napoleón Villa and Ermel Fiallo of the official 
party Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP) obtained in Quito only 3.54 percent of the votes for 
prefect and 2.22 percent of the votes for mayor of the city. In clear contrast, the candidates of 
the party Izquierda Democrática (ID) obtained 46.31 percent of the votes for prefect and 55.05 
percent of the votes for mayor, which means that, at least in the ballots, Quito had rejected 
Gutiérrez administration. This important support obtained by the candidates of the ID made 
them confident of leading the opposition to the government, and encouraged them to organize 
marches and demonstrations in the city. 
                                                          
31
 The abbreviations correspond to the following movements and parties: ID: Izquierda Democrática, MQEA/PS-FA: 
Movimiento Quito en Acción/Partidos Socialista-Frente Amplio, DP-UDC: Democracia Popular-Unión Demócrata 
Cristiana, PSP: Partido Sociedad Patriótica, PRIAN: Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional, y PRE: Partido 
Roldosista Ecuatoriano 
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 However, this electoral support did not mean that voters considered ID candidates as 
legitimate representatives of people’s grievances or as genuine leaders of the demonstrations 
they organized. One of the interviewees and former participant of the demonstrations 
organized by the mayor remembers that “to be present at the call of these guys *talking about 
leaders of the ID] who are also responsible for the poverty, it made me mad to follow them” 
(emphasis added). Even if ID leaders provided the “resources” needed for protest, this protest 
was not legitimate for its participants, because it was still organized by the same people that 
population rejected: they were still the same politicians playing the same political game. 
Merino (2005) and Saad Herreria (2005a) also recognized this disconnection between leaders 
and followers when they noted that the leadership of Quito’s Assembly had different interests 
from the people on the streets. 
 Despite the lack of legitimacy, people decided to participate in the demonstrations 
organized by ID leaders. In this decision the need to be rid of the Gutiérrez administration was 
more important than the dissatisfaction caused by the leadership of the mobilizations. Almost 
all interviewees agreed that finishing Gutiérrez’s term was urgent, and the protests called by 
militants of the ID were seen as the only viable option to do that. Nevertheless, as I have 
mentioned before, smaller marches and demonstrations were taking place in the city at the 
same time as the other big demonstrations called by traditional politicians. The demonstrations 
organized by universities (usually absent from street politics) were the most relevant, 
particularly for their impact. 
50 
 
 The participation of these universities was intended since the beginning to do 
something different from traditional strategies of protest, and thus send a new message to the 
city. For instance, when the Catholic University was covered with black cloth an observer on the 
street said to a newspaper: “I think this is an original form of protest. It is more intelligent, and 
will remain in our minds more than the confrontations on the streets with bombs and stones.”  
(El Comercio April 7, 2005:A6. Emphasis added) Moreover, these demonstrations were 
supported by university officials and even the professors that worked there. Their involvement 
and participation validated the protest. For observers and public opinion the protest was not 
just a group of insurgents interested in provoking chaos, but a strategy of contention supported 
by the most prestigious scholars in the city. In this sense the involvement of these universities 
brought “logic and rationality” back to street protests, and that explains why universities tried 
to keep political parties and traditional social movements away from their demonstrations. 
 Universities and other smaller organizations contributed in this way to legitimize a 
common although discredited form of resistance: the street demonstration. In order to do that, 
they removed from this form of protest anything that could be condemned: violence, 
irrationality and party influence. Discontented students (and later other groups of people) 
judged that street politics was a valid form of expression. In a political environment where 
“there is no chance for people’s expression” the streets offer a space for people to 
communicate their discontent. However, the legitimization of a discredited form of protest 
explains only partially why students decided to participate in protests this time. 
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 All the interviewees mentioned that they were outraged with the political situation of 
the country and with Gutiérrez’s administration; however, this feeling has a different origin in 
this particular episode. The interviewees remember that the economic situation in 2004 and 
2005 was in general good32, so that their outrage was not due to economic reasons. Instead my 
evidence supports the idea that, at the time of the rebellion, college students were outraged 
because they considered that Gutiérrez and the other politicians offended their intelligence 
with their actions and maneuvers.33 All the interviewees see themselves as citizens smart 
enough to analyze the political situation at the time, understand the real intentions of 
government and politicians, and realize that all of them were making fun of the people’s will 
and taking advantage of the state for their own benefit. When Gutiérrez claimed that he was 
defending people’s interest with his actions and policies, he actually was disrespecting 
students’ intelligence, because they knew what was actually happening in the country. 
 Therefore students made decisions based on their own educated analysis and acted in 
accordance. In other words they logically identified reasons to participate in demonstrations 
and then joined mobilizations. For instance, a law student interviewed explains that he decided 
to join the demonstrations because (as a law student) he knew the “tricks” used by government 
and politicians to legally dismiss the judges of the Supreme Court. Another student of social 
communication remembers that she joined the demonstrations when the government tried to 
                                                          
32
 According to the Central Bank of Ecuador, in 2004 the Ecuadorian GDP grew at a rate of 8%, the highest of the 
whole decade, and inflation was 2.8%. In 2005, GDP grew at 6% whereas inflation grew at 2.1%. These indicators in 
fact show a sound economy at the time.   
33
 Nevertheless, Gutiérrez’s actions did have economic consequences. For instance, the reorganization of state 
institutions implied the removal of hundreds of employees from their jobs, and thus threatened the economic 
safety of many middle class families. Therefore, governmental policies in fact did add economic concerns to 
people’s grievances. 
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close La Luna radio down, because she felt that liberty of expression was threatened by 
politicians. In my conversations with economist colleagues we remembered that part of our 
outrage was due to the fact that Gutiérrez claimed that the good economic situation of the 
country at the time was the result of his administration, when we knew that macroeconomic 
stability was due to the new monetary system of the country that was imposed in 2000.34 
Therefore, in the case of college students there exists a carefully thought out reason that made 
them feel they should participate in street demonstrations. 
 Moreover, the appointment of people with no college education for important state 
offices was also considered as an insult to college students. People considered that not even 
the president had the skills required to govern a country like Ecuador. References to the 
president’s incompetence are abundant in interviews and accounts of the rebellion of April. 
Interviewees, for instance, remember that: “this fellow *Gutiérrez+ had no idea how to lead a 
country,” or “I got tired that this dumb *Gutiérrez+ did and undid things, and he did not have 
any plan.” This lack of skills and planning in his administration supports the idea, very common 
among discontented students, that “*Gutiérrez is+ playing with people’s dignity,” that “he is not 
taking his responsibilities seriously,” and finally that he is making fun of the people who voted 
for him. 
 Although some other institutions or organizations, besides their own universities, could 
have influenced students’ interpretations,35 the important fact is that everyone in my sample 
states that the decision to participate was personal and with no external influence of 
                                                          
34
 The implementation of dollarization in Ecuador was one of the reasons for the dismissal of Jamil Mahuad as 
president. 
35
 My data do not allow me to discard this possibility completely. 
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organizations or leaders. Some of the interviewed students even consider their participation as 
their responsibility towards those with no college education, and as a historical responsibility 
for being part of Quito’s people.36 My evidence allows me to realize that those students 
understand legitimate state power as something that comes from people, and that people must 
demand from their representatives actions and behaviors that fulfill their expectations. In a 
society long considered as paternalistic (Hurtado 1997), where people only expect favors from 
the state, this idea indicates a change in political attitudes. However, the discourse of “bringing 
back power to people” has been used in previous episodes of mobilizations, and has been 
present in the political environment of the country for some years. 
 Students then decided to take the bull by the horns and do not consent that others 
make decisions on their behalf. An interviewee summarizes this idea when she says: “*…+ I think 
that it is important that we [young people] start to make the decisions for our life and for our 
future. We cannot blame others for our situation or for the country we are receiving in our 
hands.” To influence the political system they decided to protest on the streets, in many cases 
for the first time. Many students discover that street politics is a legitimate form of political 
participation. A former participant and activist summarizes what could have been the thought 
of many of the new protesters. She says: “you do not do politics at home, politics is done 
through occupation of symbolic spaces to protest against something you do not agree with, 
that creates injustice, that creates rifts, that creates nepotism, and that creates a lot of things 
that hurt the human being,” and later she also says: “these demonstrations reaffirmed our 
                                                          
36
 Given that, after independence, Quito became the center of political power in Ecuador, the city has been 
historically the setting of rebellions and revolutions. This fact has contributed to create the image of Quito’s people 
as a group proud of themselves and rebellious.   
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values: we were able to believe again and have the hope that a different way to do politics is 
possible, using different means and from different places.” 
 To demonstrate on the streets is a new form of political participation for a number of 
students. They have joined demonstrations driven by their own consciousness. In fact many of 
them defined the experience as a “birth of their political conscience” and stated that one of the 
main goals of the demonstrations was the shock that caused in their inner conscience. 
However, until April 13, marches and demonstrations had been scattered and ineffective. The 
big marches that started on that day had an additional ingredient: the intervention of La Luna 
radio station. 
 
 
 
5.2 LOOKING AT LA LUNA AND MAKING SENSE OF SPONTANEITY 
 
 
Earl (2007) and Reger (2007) analyze episodes of collective action where the “leaders” provide 
participants with a space to find each other and express their feelings. In those spaces people 
establish contacts and identify shared interests, even though there is no leadership in charge of 
arranging the process. La Luna radio, with its policy of “open microphones”, provided 
insurgents with that space for meeting and identification. The radio became the means through 
which people expressed their feelings of frustration and anger, and established contact with 
other people who shared those feelings. 
 In a political environment where people’s opinions are barely taken into account, where 
the disconnection between citizens and political leader is chronic, the involvement of La Luna 
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changed the dynamic political participation in Quito. Being able to express opinions and suggest 
strategies on air produced the idea that this time people were organizing their own resistance 
without the intervention of traditional leaders or organizations. One of the students 
remembers that: “what was beautiful about this protest was that people contributed with their 
own ideas. The day of the cacerolazo, for instance, it was Paco Velasco’s idea, but after that, 
the tablazo, the reventón, the bombazo37 were all people’s ideas. I mean, nobody was leading, 
it was people that called to the radio and expressed their stuff.” The instructions from the radio 
were regarded as legitimate, because people felt that they were organizing the movement on 
their own. 
 This back-and-forth relationship between people and the radio helped to increase the 
radio audience as well as the number of participants involved in resistance and demonstrations. 
The relationship occurred in two moments. During the first moment the radio received 
information from people through phone calls, and based on that information planned actions 
and strategies,38 these strategies then were broadcast to the city. In a second moment people 
that received the information given by the radio communicated it to their close networks 
(family, friends or acquaintances), and advised these new participants to listen to La Luna. 
Thereafter more people established a direct contact with the radio station. Since each 
participant repeated the process with his or her own networks, they produce an expansive 
effect for the original call. An interviewee remembers that: “people called the radio to express 
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 Although the interviewee mentions this particular strategy, I could not find any reference in the literature or in 
newspapers. 
38
 My data do not allow me to determine how decisions were made at the radio station. However, all the 
information I have reviewed suggests that people participated actively in the decision-making process particularly 
through phone calls. 
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their anger, and *the message+ was spread little by little. ‘Hey, today we are going to do the 
tablazo, or today we are going to do the cacerolazo‘ *first moment+. Then people that went to 
participate spread the message to their families or friends: ‘hey, tomorrow we are going to do 
the tablazo, it is not the cacerolazo anymore, and you must listen to La Luna’ *second 
moment+” And later in the interview “it was as if a middle class radio station like La Luna, that 
only some people used to listen to, suddenly reached a lot of people.” 
 In this way participants were recruited and night demonstrations were organized during 
an entire week. Nevertheless, I cannot consider the radio station as a mere transmission belt 
for people’s grievances and strategies. It is safe to assume that all the information chosen to be 
broadcast had to be compatible with the political principles that had oriented the work of the 
radio for years.39 In fact not all the proposals that the radio received were treated in the same 
way, and some ideas were more supported than others. Under those conditions the radio made 
important decisions and offered a space relatively free of censorship for people to express their 
discontent. This mechanism allowed La Luna to mobilize many people while maintaining the 
idea that the call was made by people themselves. However, for this mechanism to work some 
special characteristics had to be fulfilled. Mainly, this strategy of recruitment was successful 
because in the city rejections of and dissatisfaction with the government were general. 
 Morris and Staggenborg (2002) point out that: “If there exists a mass base of people 
who share an institutional frame that is conducive to collective action, the difficulty of 
mobilizing large numbers of people for risky behavior can be reduced considerably.” This seems 
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 For a reference on the political principles of La Luna radio the reader can review the book of Dubravcic Alaiza 
(2002)   
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to be the case of the Rebelion de los Forajidos. During the previous months media had 
thoroughly informed the public about government’s illegalities and acts of corruption. Although 
media did not support mobilizations explicitly or the dismissal of Gutiérrez as president, they 
contributed to create a frame of interpretation where the main problem of the system was the 
administration of Lucio Gutiérrez. When La Luna “assumed” the leadership of mobilizations, 
there was already a general dissatisfaction against Gutiérrez,40 so that Paco Velasco and his 
broadcasters did not need to advance a particular frame of interpretations or look for support 
of outsiders and bystanders for a particular cause. The frame and the support for the protest 
were already there and the “leader” simply took advantage of them. 
 Obviously, different organizations and movements developed alternative frames and 
offered diverse strategies, but this variety of agendas made collective action difficult at the 
beginning since leaders of those movements and organizations were not able to reach a general 
consensus. This is the case of some organizations of college students. In his interview a leader 
of one of these organizations remembers that: “some fellows came here to tell us: ‘come to the 
marches with us, because we want democracy to come back to the country, we want the 
dismissal of illegal judges’ and so on, and when we asked them what they want *as a final goal+, 
they said: ‘we want the old supreme court back, because that is the only constitutional solution 
[to the crisis+’ *…+ we did not agree with that. Our goal was a rebellion to achieve a deep change 
in the system.” These organizations could not reach an agreement and organized separate 
demonstrations. 
                                                          
40
 Data presented in Figures 3 and 4 are also evidence of this rejection.  
58 
 
 La Luna’s involvement solved this problem by offering a radical option that also was 
widely accepted: ¡Lucio Fuera! ¡Todos Fuera! or Lucio out! Everybody out! Supporting these 
specific objectives had two important consequences for the protest: (a) it avoided a process of 
negotiation of different agendas, and (b) it offered aggrieved people the radical option they 
were looking for. Therefore, the objectives promoted by La Luna gained supporters from 
different sectors and organizations, even if they had different agendas. Nevertheless, there was 
a negative consequence for the future of mobilization: since demonstrations were not based on 
a programmatic plan, but on short-term objectives, after achieving these immediate goals, the 
movement was condemned to disappear, as actually happened. 
 On a related issue, one of the most difficult problems that social movement leaders face 
is to present appropriately the ideology and proposals of the movement to the general public, 
and gain support from media and outsiders. The struggle to get attention from the media can 
be a task that determines the success or failure of a particular campaign. During the Rebelión de 
los Forajidos this problem was avoided since the “leader” (Paco Velasco) was part of the media. 
Most accounts agreed that once La Luna got involved in the mobilizations, the radio devoted 24 
hours a day to mobilizing people and put on the air information useful for insurgents. One of 
the interviewees pointed out that: “the day that the radio was closed down, I looked for 
another station and nobody [was informing about the demonstrations in Quito]. It was like 
nothing were happening in the city while you could hear people on the streets, making noise 
with the horns, shouting slogans *…+ and television was the same, as if nothing were going on.”  
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Besides, unlike other cases presented in the literature, media coverage was not the 
main problem of “leaders” and insurgents. Contrasting with other episodes of collective action 
where social movements try to call people’s attention on a particular issue not widely 
recognized, in the case of the Rebellión de los Forajidos the issue at stake was at the center of 
public discussion and debate so that the task of gaining people’s attention was reduced 
considerably. Governmental issues are traditionally a center of media and public attention 
(Rohlinger 2006) and this specific episode of mobilization had to do mainly with governmental 
issues that affected the social welfare of the whole country. For the case of this rebellion media 
attention was not a problem, but a resource for the movement.  
 The radio encouraged mass mobilizations as the alternative for citizen’s participation, 
and used passionate and even dramatic discourse to mobilize people. Another interviewee 
mentions that: “I think that Paco Velasco and the radio magnified the facts with an 
inflammatory discourse, and mobilized people, and of course, since people were really angry 
for all the things that this guy [Gutierrez] did, it was the right moment to agitate to get a 
mobilization.” However, at that time discontented people felt represented by Velasco’s 
speeches. Listeners even valued the bravery of the radio for taking an openly confrontational 
attitude against the government. 
 Yet the radio station also offered a less expensive alternative to contribute to the 
insurgency: the phone call. La Luna radio coordinated a protest in a new space where the costs 
and risks of participation were reduced considerably while reinforcing a feeling of democratic 
participation. Everyone who wanted to take part in the protest only had to call the radio and 
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express their dissatisfaction. The radio made the protest an affordable activity for an important 
number of potential insurgents. 
 The direct interaction between the radio and the insurgents widened the space for the 
protest and increased the forms of participation. An episode frequently mentioned in the 
literature written about the rebellion may help to illustrate this point. One of the interviewees 
remembers that: “*when we were+ downtown, we could listen to them (referring to La Luna’s 
broadcasters); people [in the houses on the sides of the streets] placed speakers on the 
windows and put on La Luna radio, then it was like a connection, because one block down 
protesters were singing the same thing as one block up, and another one up. This would not 
have been possible, if everyone had not been listening to the radio.” Besides the important 
work of coordination filled by the radio, the point here is that by placing speakers on the 
windows, people at their homes actually participated in street protests, while avoiding the risks 
of confrontation. Therefore, because of the radio the rebellion was composed of much more 
people than the observed participants on the streets. 
 An additional feature that helped to achieve important levels of participation was the 
idea of organizing night protests. Part of the discredit of street protests in Quito has to do with 
the high economic costs that daytime protests imply. To avoid this problem people, through the 
radio, organized night demonstrations, taking part of their free time to protest. In supporting 
this option, they introduced an element of novelty in the mobilizations. Night demonstrations, 
in turn, were attractive to bystanders and many of them ultimately decided to join the protest. 
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 Finally, I have to emphasize the fact that Paco Velasco and his staff always rejected the 
adjective of “leaders”, instead they highlighted the direct participation of the people in the 
decision-making process. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out previously, the radio was not just 
a “transmission belt”, and actually influenced directly many decisions supporting some ideas 
instead of others. What is worth mentioning is that there was a direct channel of 
communication between the “leaders” of the mobilization and their followers. Paco Velasco 
received first-hand information from the very bases of the movement, and this reinforced the 
idea that people were organizing their own resistance without formal organizations or 
professional leaders. Paco Velasco was at the least an organizer and articulator of individual 
and dispersed efforts of protest. One of the interviewees mentions that: “I think that in the 
voice of this man of La Luna radio [referring to Paco Velasco] we found a link among what every 
one of us thought, because at the beginning nobody protested as a whole, and everybody has 
particular opinions, and everybody has different ideas, but this man could organize us.” 
 To conclude this section, I would like propose some ideas aimed to make sense of the 
issue of spontaneity. As I have mentioned, La Luna established a direct channel between 
aggrieved people and the “leaders” of the movement. This direct mechanism allowed decision-
makers to take into account a lot of information provided by people, and propose actions and 
strategies for the mobilization. Therefore this mechanism eliminated the disconnection 
between “leaders” and followers while creating a feeling of real democratic participation. In the 
memories of former participants the Rebelión de los Forajidos was organized by people on their 
own, although Paco Velasco and La Luna radio shaped the “official” discourse. 
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 On the other hand, college students believe that the decision to participate in the 
rebellion was the product of their rational analysis without the influence of any particular 
leader or organization. They feel that they acted in obedience of their own will, and that they 
did not need anybody to persuade them to act. For that reason students consider their 
participation in the demonstrations called by the mayor as illegitimate.  
 The involvement of La Luna in the conflict offered a valid alternative for college 
students. Now they can join demonstrations and still think that they are obeying their own will, 
because this time the demonstrations are organized by the people without any external 
influence. Then participants consider that the demonstrations are spontaneous because there 
is no external influence on them. However, many organizations and the media have contributed 
to creating the political environment for mobilizations and vindicate old forms of contention. 
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Although during the Rebelión de los Forajidos there were leaders and organizations that 
contributed to creating the environment for mobilizations and to shaping the protest, former 
participants believe that the rebellion was spontaneous and completely organized by the 
people. This belief is based on the fact that there was a mechanism of direct communication 
between insurgents and organizers. In fact, this mechanism eliminated the disconnection 
between leaders and followers frequently observed in episodes of collective action. Moreover, 
among participants considered in this paper there is the conviction that they acted in 
obedience to their own will without any external influence. This mechanism of participation 
coupled with participants’ conviction reinforces the idea that the mobilizations were 
spontaneous.  
 However, the rebellion was more the result of the integration of diffuse efforts of 
contention under the coordination of a radio station. To mobilize aggrieved people and gain 
support for demonstrations the organizers concentrated on radical short-term goals that were 
widely accepted in Quito. Nevertheless, the process of recruitment was successful because 
some organizations, particularly private universities, had prepared the environment for 
mobilizations. Most importantly, private universities contributed to vindicating old and 
discredited forms of protest. The vindication of these forms in turn legitimated street politics 
and attracted new participants to the demonstrations. 
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 The rebellion could also be organized successfully with no formal organizations or 
professional leadership in part because of its short life and general objectives. A non-enduring 
struggle certainly avoided many tasks that are essential for other social movements such as 
fund-raising, getting media attention, coordination with similar movements, and strategic 
planning. The Rebelión de los Forajidos did not produce an important social movement or a 
permanent struggle; instead it practically disappeared after one of the goals was achieved. 
Despite this fact the rebellion was important because actually it established a new form of 
political participation independent of political parties or traditional movements that had been 
present in the institutional political system.  
The rebellion taught us that in an environment where dissatisfaction is widely shared, it 
is possible to coordinate diffuse efforts of protest to reach big objectives. The evidence offered 
in this study suggests that, under these circumstances, the existence of a direct mechanism of 
communication among discontented people can enormously facilitate collective action and can 
replace the work of formal organizations and professional leadership. However, the 
mobilizations achieved in that way have an important emotional component and have been 
organized around widely shared feelings of anger and dissatisfaction. When these feelings have 
been eliminated due to the achievement of a particular goal (in this particular case the 
dismissal of a president) the movement disappears almost immediately. 
Scholarship then needs to take more into account these particular episodes where 
mobilizations of the initial stages do not produce social movements. Leadership in this kind of 
episodes may be constructed and conceived in a different way, and simple mechanisms of 
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communication may cause a great impact on the possibility of achieving collective action. 
However, this collective action appears still unstructured and is condemned to disappear soon 
even if the mobilizations they produced could achieve important objectives, even the dismissal 
of a President. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE REBELION DE LOS FORAJIDOS 
Table A 1: Social movements in recent episodes of presidential dismissal 
President Overthrown 
Abdalá Bucaram 
(02/06/1997) 
Jamil Mahuad 
(01/21/2000) 
Lucio Gutiérrez 
(04/20/2005) 
Differences 
Leadership 
 Political parties 
 Traditional social movements’ 
leadership 
 Confederacion de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE 
- Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador) 
 Insurgent military colonels 
 No visible leadership 
Participants 
 Traditional social movements: 
students, workers, teachers, 
political parties’ militants 
 Indigenous people 
 Middle and upper class people 
from Quito, including women, 
children and old people  
Repertoires 
 Mass confrontational 
mobilizations with the use of 
violence 
 Indigenous mobilization with 
moderate use of violence and 
military strategies 
 Peaceful mobilizations (at the 
beginning) with the use of 
innovative ways of protest 
making use of symbolism 
Commonalities 
Political environment 
 General discontent about governmental policies. The discontent was shared among important political and 
economic elites as well as among people in general  
Location  Quito 
Army 
 As institution has been the most important actor. By removing its support from the president the army has 
determined the success of mobilizations. 
Congress  It legalized the new president after the old one was removed from office 
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ECUADORIAN INSTITUTIONS 
 
Table A 2: Spanish names used 
Spanish name Acr. English translation 
Governmental Institutions 
Tribunal Constitucional TC Constitutional Court 
Tribunal Supremo Electoral TSE Supreme Electoral Court 
Movements and Organizations 
Centro Andino de Acción Popular CAAP Andean Center for Popular Action 
Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas del Ecuador 
CONAIE 
National Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities 
Federación de Estudiantes Secundarios del 
Ecuador 
FESE Federation of High School Students of Ecuador 
Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios 
del Ecuador 
FEUE Federation of University Students of Ecuador 
Movimiento Quito en Acción MQEA Quito in Motion Movement 
Unión Nacional de Educadores UNE National Union of Educators 
Political Parties 
Coalición Democracia Popular - Unión 
Demócrata Cristiana 
DP-UDC 
Popular Democracy – Christian Democratic 
Movement Coalition 
Coalición Partido Socialista - Frente 
Amplio 
PS-FA Socialist Party – Broad Front Coalition  
Izquierda Democrática ID Democratic Left 
Movimiento Popular Democrático MPD Popular Democratic Movement 
Partido Renovador Institucional Acción 
Nacional 
PRIAN 
Party for Institutional Renovation and National 
Action 
Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano PRE Ecuadorian Roldosista Party 
Partido Social Cristiano PSC Social Christian Party 
Partido Sociedad Patriótica PSP Patriotic Society Party 
Universities 
Escuela Politécnica Nacional EPN National Polytechnic School 
Pontificia Universidad Católica del 
Ecuador 
PUCE Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador 
Universidad Politécnica Salesiana UPS Salesian Polytechnic University 
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REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION 
 
Table A 3: Repertoires of the Rebelion de los Forajidos 
Name of the 
action in Spanish 
Action description Date of the action41 
Cacerolazo Pot-banging in public places Wednesday, April 13 
Reventón 
Balloon-bursting at a specific moment of the protest. The 
balloons were intended to make fun of the president’s big cheeks 
Thursday, April 14 
Tablazo Noise made by banging two pieces of wood (tablas) Friday, April 15 
Rollazo 
Use of toilet paper to cover houses, buildings, trees, cars and 
everything else in an attempt to clean the city of all the “shit” of 
Gutierrez’s administration 
Saturday, April 16 
Golpe de Estadio 
This is a pun in Spanish referring to coup d’état (golpe de estado). 
During the traditional soccer games of the national league on 
Sundays, people shouted against the government in the stadiums 
during the halftime and at the end of the games. 
Sunday, April 17 
Cuadernazo* 
March organized by the students of the EPN carrying their 
notebooks (cuadernos) with them. 
Monday, April 18 
Apagón* 
To turn off the lights during five minutes in the whole city in 
order to resemble the “political darkness” of the country. 
Monday, April 18 
Pitazo 
Noise made with the horns (pitos) of the cars on the main streets 
and avenues of the city. 
Tuesday, April 19 
Mochilazo 
On this day the Secretary of Education suspended classes when 
students were already in their schools. Instead of returning to 
their homes, students went to the Tribuna de la Shyris to 
demonstrate against the government. Since they were carrying 
their backpacks (mochilas) the demonstration was called 
mochilazo. 
Wednesday, April 20 
Frenazo* To stop cars in streets and avenues. N.A. 
   
Actions signaled with an asterix (*) were not reported in newspapers, although they are mentioned in 
some testimonials. 
 
  
                                                          
41
 Date when the action took place for the first time as reported by newspapers and testimonials. Some of these 
actions (the cacerolazo and  the pitazo, for instance) took place during the whole week of demonstrations. 
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